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Introduction  
 The subprime mortgage market, which consists of high-cost loans designed for borrowers 
with weak credit,1 has grown tremendously over the past ten years.  Between 1993 and 2005, the 
subprime market experienced an average annual growth rate of 26 percent.2  As this market 
emerged, so did allegations that subprime loans contained predatory features or were the result of 
predatory sales practices.3  In the worst cases, brokers deceived borrowers about the meaning of 
loan terms or falsely promised to assist them in obtaining future refinance loans with better terms.  
In other situations, borrowers entered into loans with low teaser rates, not aware how high their 
monthly payments could go when their interest rates reset.4   
Many policy-makers across the country agree that subprime loans provide an important 
vehicle for making credit available to consumers; however, concerns about abuses in the subprime 
market have led the federal government and most states to enact laws that place limits on subprime 
lending.  The federal government led the way with the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA), which was enacted in 1994.  A growing number of states followed suit, passing laws 
modeled on HOEPA (known as “mini-HOEPA laws”).  Today, well over half the states have anti-
predatory lending statutes of one kind or another.5  These laws vary in terms of the loans they cover, 
the practices they prohibit, and the methods of enforcement they permit.  In addition to the mini-
                                                 
1 There are different definitions of the term “subprime loans.”  Some limit the term’s meaning to non-conforming 
mortgages made to borrowers with impaired or non-existent credit.  Over time, however, this definition has proven 
unsatisfactory, given the growing evidence that large proportions of high-cost mortgages went to borrowers with credit 
scores high enough to qualify for prime loans.  See, e.g., Brooks & Simon (2007).  More recent definitions have tended 
to focus on the high-cost structure of subprime loans, without regard to the borrowers’ characteristics.    
2 Gramlich (2007a, p. 2); see also Waggoner (2007). 
3 While predatory lending is hard to define with precision, generally it is concentrated in the subprime market and 
involves excessive prices in view of the borrowers’ risk or lending without regard to borrowers’ ability to repay.  Engel 
and McCoy define predatory lending as a syndrome of loan terms or practices involving one or more of the following 
features:  (1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (2) rent-seeking; (3) illegal 
fraud or deception; (4) other information asymmetries favoring brokers or lenders; (5) mandatory arbitration clauses; (6) 
lending discrimination; and (7) servicing abuses.  Engel & McCoy (2007, pp. 2043-45).  
4 Truth in Lending Act rules at the time did not require lenders to inform borrowers about the exact dollar amounts of 
their maximum possible monthly payments following rate reset.  McCoy (2007). 
5 Azmy (2005).  
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HOEPA laws, numerous states have laws that pre-date HOEPA and prohibit specific loan terms 
such as prepayment penalties or balloon payments.  These laws function alone or alongside more 
comprehensive mini-HOEPA laws.   
As home mortgage default and foreclosures rates have escalated in recent years,6 anti-
predatory lending measures have moved into the policy limelight.  Lenders and others in the 
mortgage industry claim that the laws drive up the cost and reduce the availability of credit, 
especially to low-income borrowers.  In contrast, those who endorse the laws argue that they are 
needed to protect vulnerable consumers and the communities in which they live.7  They further 
argue that any costs are de minimis relative to the protection the laws provide.   
Any laws that place restrictions on loan terms and lending practices invariably have some 
effect on credit flows in the home mortgage market.  Until recently, the nature and extent of those 
effects have only been speculative.  The availability of loan pricing and other data now makes it 
possible to evaluate the impact of laws on the flow and cost of credit.  In this chapter, we review 
past studies on the impact of anti-predatory lending laws and describe the results of our own 
research, which expands on prior studies by: (1) using a more nuanced legal index; (2) examining 
anti-predatory lending laws that pre-date HOEPA as well as the HOEPA analogues; (3) looking at 
the role of enforcement mechanisms, including assignee liability laws, on loan volumes; and (4) 
disaggregating anti-predatory lending laws along three dimensions—coverage, restrictions, and 
enforcement.  
                                                 
6 By year-end 2007, approximately 21 percent of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages were past due 90 days or more.  
Bernanke 2008.   
7 Apgar & Duda (2005); Engel (2006). 
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Description of Anti-Predatory Lending Laws 
Anti-predatory lending laws take two forms.  The older laws typically prohibit one or a few 
specific loan terms, such as prepayment penalties.8  The more modern laws are patterned on the 
federal HOEPA law.  HOEPA governs “high-cost” loans, which are defined as loans that exceed 
one of two triggers: (1) where the annual percentage rate (APR) at consummation exceeds the yield 
on Treasury securities of comparable maturity plus eight percent for first-lien loans or ten percent 
for subordinate lien loans or (2) where the total points and fees exceed eight percent of the total loan 
amount or $547, whichever is greater.9  HOEPA covers, at most, one percent of subprime 
residential mortgages.10  For that narrow set of loans, HOEPA restricts numerous lending terms and 
practices, including balloon terms and prepayment penalties.   Lenders must also make specialized, 
advance disclosures to borrowers receiving HOEPA loans.  HOEPA imposes liability for violations 
on lenders and assignees of HOEPA loans.11  
 In 1999, North Carolina passed the first mini-HOEPA law.  This statute adopted the HOEPA 
APR trigger, but used a lower points and fees trigger and provided more extensive substantive 
protections than HOEPA.  In short order, other states followed North Carolina’s lead and enacted 
mini-HOEPA laws of their own.  Some of these laws augmented existing laws and others were 
states’ first forays into limiting loan terms.  As of 2007, over thirty states had mini-HOEPA laws 
                                                 
8 These laws are part of state usury laws or found in state versions of the Uniform Consumer Commercial Code.  
Alexander (1987); Eskridge (1984); Whitman (1992). 
 
9 HOEPA, §§ 1601 et seq.  The points and fees trigger is subject to annual indexing. $547 was the trigger amount in 
2007. 
10 Gramlich (2007b, p. 28). 
11 Federal Reserve System (2001).  In general, holders of HOEPA loans "are subject to all claims and defenses . .  .  that 
could be raised against the original lender." HOEPA §1641(d). 
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while only six states had neither mini-HOEPA laws nor laws regulating prepayment penalties or 
balloon clauses in home mortgages.12 
There is wide variation among the coverage, restriction and enforcement provisions in state 
mini-HOEPA laws.  Although some states have adopted the same coverage triggers as HOEPA, 
most set their triggers below one or both of the HOEPA triggers.  Still others have some laws that 
apply to all mortgage loans without any triggers and other laws that apply only to high-cost loans.  
With regard to restrictions, prohibited practices also vary widely in both quantity and quality among 
the states.  For example, some states ban prepayment penalties altogether while others only ban 
prepayment penalties after five years from origination.13   
Like the coverage and restriction provisions, state laws establish an array of different 
enforcement provisions, from exclusive governmental enforcement to private redress by aggrieved 
borrowers in court.  Some laws allow borrowers to bring claims against loan originators alone, 
while other laws also authorize assignee liability, which permits borrowers to recover against 
securitized trusts and other holders of notes.  Available relief ranges from actual damages to civil 
penalties or punitive damages.14 
Studies of Anti-Predatory Lending Laws 
Although some states have regulated practices associated with predatory lending for 
decades, until recently there were no studies evaluating the effects of anti-predatory lending laws 
(other than caps on interest rates) on credit flows and loan prices.  That changed with the passage of 
                                                 
12 A few states eschewed mini-HOEPA laws and instead required expanded disclosures to borrowers.  Other states 
focused on mortgage brokers by expanding broker licensing requirements and subjecting brokers to greater regulation.  
Similarly, numerous cities and counties passed anti-predatory lending ordinances.  The city and county ordinances are 
either limited in scope to lenders who contract with the cities or have been preempted.  Bostic et al. (2008). 
13 See, e.g., Annotated Laws of Mass. ch. 183C, § 5 (banning all prepayment penalties in high-cost loans); 63 
Pennsylvania Statutes § 456.511(f)  (prohibiting prepayment penalties in high-cost loans after five years). 
14 Federal law has preempted portions of these state laws at various times for certain types of lenders and loan products.  
McCoy & Renuart (2007). 
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North Carolina’s anti-predatory lending law in 1999.  Since then, several studies have assessed the 
impact of state mini-HOEPA laws on lending patterns. 
An early study by Morgan Stanley surveyed subprime branch managers and mortgage 
brokers across the country to learn their views on the impact of anti-predatory lending laws on loan 
volumes.  The investment bank reported that growth forecasts by respondents in states with tough 
laws were not significantly different from growth forecasts by respondents in less regulated states.  
The report observed, “One of the consistent messages we heard from our respondents was that the 
increased level of disclosures was boosting consumer comfort levels with subprime products and 
thus providing a positive impact on loan volume.”15 
Li and Ernst used a database of securitized subprime loans from January 1998 through 
December 2004 to study the effect of state laws on loan originations.  The study ranked state laws 
according to the type of loans covered, points-and-fee triggers, substantive legal protections, and 
remedies available to borrowers.  Based on their findings, the authors concluded that, for the most 
part, state mini-HOEPA laws did not lead to a reduction in subprime originations and reduced the 
number of subprime loans with predatory terms.  In addition, in all but two states with anti-
predatory lending laws, the nominal interest rates on home mortgages were static or dropped when 
compared with the control states.16 
Ho and Pennington-Cross used HMDA data to conduct a cross-border study of the impact of 
anti-predatory lending laws on the probability of subprime applications, originations, and 
rejections.17  They developed a legal index that ranked the strength of anti-predatory lending laws 
and, using this index, compared loan volumes in adjacent states with and without anti-predatory 
lending laws.  The results were that the typical state anti-predatory lending law: (1) did not have an 
                                                 
15 Morgan Stanley (2002, p. 11). 
16 Li & Ernst (2006). 
17 This cross-border analysis helped hold labor and housing markets constant. 
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impact on the probability of originations; (2) had a small negative effect on the likelihood of 
applications; and (3) reduced the chances that borrowers would be rejected.  However, in states with 
stronger restrictions, the likelihood of originations and applications dropped.  State anti-predatory 
lending laws with broad coverage increased the likelihood of subprime originations and 
applications.18   
Ho and Pennington-Cross took the same approach in a study of the impact of state anti-
predatory lending laws on the cost of credit.  They found that anti-predatory lending laws that more 
strongly restrict lending practices modestly drive up the cost of borrowing on fixed-rate loans.  The 
results also indicate that it is very easy for lenders to avoid coverage of most laws on adjustable-rate 
mortgages by designing loans in ways that reduce the reportable and the actual APR below the 
laws’ triggers.19   
A national study by Elliehausen et al. used a data set that included about twenty-two percent 
of the total volume of subprime mortgages (defined as high-cost loans) made by eight large lenders 
from 1999 through 2004, to study the impact of anti-predatory lending laws.  The authors used 
several approaches to examine the effect of state laws on subprime originations and found that 
subprime originations dropped in states with anti-predatory lending laws.  They argued that these 
results reflected a supply-side phenomenon; lenders substituted loans that fell below the triggers in 
the new anti-predatory lending laws for high-cost loans that would be subject to laws.20  
Expanding the Field  
The various studies of the new anti-predatory lending laws all have limitations.  In our 
study, we attempt to address some of these limitations.  In particular, we examine state laws that 
                                                 
18 Ho & Pennington-Cross (2006b). 
19 Ho & Pennington-Cross (2006a). Cf. Gramlich (2007a, pp. 11-12) (expressing concern about the possibility of similar 
evasion under HOEPA and proposing lower HOEPA triggers for adjustable-rate loans than for fixed-rate loans).  
20 Elliehausen et al. (2006). 
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were enacted prior to HOEPA as well as state laws that were modeled on HOEPA.  As a result, we 
are able to look at the individual effects of both the old and new state laws and, in states that had 
older laws and newer mini-HOEPA laws, we can assess the effect of adding a new law to an 
existing regime.    
Creating the Legal Index 
We created a legal index by engaging in a careful textual review of every anti-predatory 
lending statute throughout the country that was in force in 2004 or 2005.  The legal indexes used in 
other studies were created from charts summarizing laws that had been compiled by non-profits, 
trade associations, or lending industry lawyers.  Our legal index is both more complete and more 
nuanced than prior efforts.  As it is more fully described in Bostic, et al. (2008), the procedure is 
only sketched here.  Following Ho and Pennington-Cross, we include four coverage and four 
restriction measures.  We expand, however, on Ho and Pennington-Cross by adding a new 
dimension — enforcement mechanisms — that takes into account the potential liability of owners 
of loans, known as assignees, and other remedial provisions in the laws.   
As Appendix A1 describes, we gave each law a score for coverage, restrictions and 
enforcement, with a higher score indicating a stronger law.  The coverage measure takes into 
account the types of loans covered by the law; the broader the law’s coverage, the higher the 
coverage score.21  The restrictions measure takes into account the strength of each law’s credit 
counseling provisions and restrictions on prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and restrictions 
on loan terms that limit or bar borrowers’ access to the courts.  Again, the more restrictive the law, 
the higher the score.  The enforcement score reflects the types and strength of enforcement 
mechanisms allowed – i.e., governmental only or also private remedies for injured borrowers.  This 
                                                 
21 Among other things, the coverage score helps distinguish between older laws that cover the entire residential 
mortgage market from certain newer laws that only cover high-cost loans. 
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enforcement measure makes a particularly unique contribution.  One issue that is at the center of 
current policy debates is whether the ultimate purchasers of mortgage notes, including securitized 
trusts, should be liable for wrongdoing by originators.22  Our methodology allows us to study the 
scope of such assignee liability provisions and their effect on credit flows.   
Each state then received a score along each measure (the lowest score was a 1), a component 
score for coverage, restrictions, and enforcement and an overall score.   We constructed additive 
and multiplicative indices using the three component scores.  Appendix A2 lists the constructed 
values for each state. 
The Data 
To assess the impact of these state laws, we used 2004 and 2005 HMDA data, which 
captures most residential mortgage lending.23  This data permitted us to assess: (1) the probability of 
applying for a subprime loan relative to a prime loan; (2) the probability of originating a subprime 
loan relative to a prime loan; and (3) the probability of a subprime application being rejected.  For 
2004, we defined loans as subprime if they were made by lenders identified as subprime by HUD.24  
For 2005, we used the HUD subprime list and alternatively used HMDA pricing information to 
identify subprime loans.25  We considered HMDA-reported loans that had APR yield spreads of 3 
percentage points or more above the comparable Treasury yields to be subprime.   
Cross Border Analysis  
 Most studies of anti-predatory lending laws examine the impact of laws on loan volumes 
and prices statewide.  This approach fails to take into account intra-state variations in economic 
                                                 
22 In recent years, up to 80 percent of subprime loans were securitized.  Engel & McCoy (2007). 
23 We excluded states in which the anti-predatory lending laws changed or took effect in the middle of the calendar year 
in either 2004 or 2005.   
24 HUD included a lender on its subprime list where subprime loans accounted for fifty percent or more of the lender’s 
total mortgage originations.  Under that approach, lenders were free to identify themselves as subprime based either on 
the credit profile of their borrowers or the high-cost nature of their loans.  Scheessele (1999). 
25 We did not use the HMDA price information for our analysis of the 2004 data because of concerns about reporting 
and other errors in the data.  Bostic et al. (2008). 
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conditions that could influence credit markets.  To avoid this pitfall, we used a cross-border sample. 
Our sample only included loans from counties located on state borders, where one of the two border 
states had an anti-predatory lending law.26   
The base model can thus be specified as: 
    iii
VAWV
ALFLj
jijiit LocationBorrowerBorderLawOutcome εβββββ +++++= ∑
=
43210   
where i and j index, respectively, the individual loans and the state border pair, Law reflects the 
presence and strength of an anti-predatory lending law, Border indicates that loans are in border 
counties for the indicated pair, Borrower and Location reflect borrower and location specific 
characteristics, and ε is the error term.27   
In the analysis below, we consider various specifications of the Law vector.  Two 
specifications use the combined (composite) index that aggregates scores across the three 
dimensions.  To establish whether index construction is important, we evaluate combined indexes 
that are additive and multiplicative in their construction.  We also disaggregate these combined 
indexes to determine whether and how individual components of the legal framework – i.e., 
coverage, restrictions, and enforcement mechanisms -- affect mortgage outcomes.  Finally, we 
distinguish between state provisions in older laws and those in the newer mini-HOEPA laws.  
Empirical results 
Originations 
 Table 1 reports the results of estimates of how anti-predatory lending laws influence the 
relative probability of originating a subprime loan instead of a prime loan.  We only report the law 
related variables but all other control variable results are available on request from the authors.  
                                                 
26 In a separate article (Bostic et al. (2008)), we used the same data and sampling technique; however we took a 
different sample.  The results using the two different samples were virtually the same. 
27 For a complete discussion of these controls, see Bostic et al. (2008). 
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Estimates using the combined indexes (both additive and multiplicative) consistently suggest that 
older laws usually make a subprime origination more likely than prime, while the newer laws have 
no significant effect on the likelihood of a subprime origination (except for one result in 2004).    
However, subsequent estimates indicate that these aggregated metrics mask important influences. 
 First, the individual components of the legal framework turn out to be important.  We 
observe fewer subprime originations relative to prime originations where laws are more restrictive 
but comparatively more subprime originations where laws have broader coverage or enforcement 
mechanisms.    
 Moreover, when we further deconstruct the indexes to distinguish between older and newer 
laws, we find that both older and newer laws are important.  Enforcement provisions appear to be 
the most important consideration for the older laws.  The results show that the stronger the 
enforcement mechanisms in the older laws, the more likely an application is to be a subprime.   
 Among the newer laws, laws with greater restrictions reduce the probability of a subprime 
origination compared to that of a prime origination.  Newer laws with broader coverage are 
associated with a higher probability of a subprime origination relative to prime.28  It is perhaps these 
opposite forces that explain the lack of significant results using the aggregated indexes.  The 
restrictions results might be a supply side story, with lenders being limited as to the subprime 
products they can offer.  The coverage results – like the enforcement results for the old laws -- may 
reflect a judgment by stronger prospective applicants who had previously stayed on the sidelines 
that the new laws gave them added protection against potentially abusive lenders, leading them to 
apply and to have their applications approved.  On balance, these results are broadly consistent with 
those observed in prior research.   
                                                 
28 Under our analysis, the definition of a subprime loan for purposes of calculating origination, application, and 
rejection probabilities remains the same whether a law’s coverage is narrow or broad. 
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Rejections 
 As seen in Table 2, the combined indexes show a limited relationship with the likelihood of 
a subprime rejection.  But, as we saw for originations, these belie more significant effects for the 
individual components.  Indeed, when the indexes are disaggregated and the components are 
considered individually, restrictions, coverage, and enforcement provisions all have significant 
relationships with the probability of rejection.   
 The effects here are opposite from, but consistent with, those observed for originations.  
Greater restrictions are associated with increases in the likelihood of rejection.  This could arise 
because the restrictions limit the types of products that lenders might consider offering, which in 
turn limits the types of borrower profiles (in terms of credit risk, etc.) that are likely to be approved.  
If so, then one would expect elevated rejection rates in high-restriction states after controlling for 
borrower profiles.   
We also find that broader coverage and tougher enforcement reduce the probability of 
rejection.  Moreover, the coverage effects appear to be stronger than the enforcement relationships 
across the board.  Once again, extending coverage to a wider swath of subprime loans and adopting 
strong enforcement mechanisms may boost the confidence of better quality borrowers who, without 
legal protection, would fear exploitation. If more creditworthy borrowers are entering the mix, one 
would expect rejection probabilities to decline.   
 These rejection results are robust.  They are broadly consistent across the two years and are 
qualitatively identical for both the older and newer laws.  That said, the strength of the effects is 
greater for the newer laws.  That is not surprising, because most of the newer laws contain multiple 
restrictions, unlike the older laws, which tended to have fewer restrictions.  This suggests that the 
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new law mechanisms may have had an important impact on underwriting policies and outcomes and 
on borrowers’ comfort with subprime products.   
Applications 
 The results for the probability of a subprime application versus a prime application (table 3) 
are largely statistically insignificant and inconsistent across different specifications. However, there 
are some consistent results. 
 When the components are disaggregated, the results for coverage are consistently negative – 
greater coverage is associated with a lower probability that an application will be subprime and a 
greater probability that an application will be prime.  This holds when one uses both the combined 
indexes or breaks the index out according to older and newer laws.  The enforcement relationships 
are inconsistent across law type and largely insignificant when aggregated.    
Interactions Among the Components in the Legal Framework 
 So far, we have considered the legal framework components in isolation.  However, these 
components could be interacting with one another in different ways.  They might be mutually 
reinforcing such that strength along one dimension amplifies the effects associated with another 
dimension.  Alternatively, they could be counter-balancing, so strength in one dimension reduces 
the strength of the relationship for another dimension.  To explore these possibilities, we re-
estimated the relationships including interaction terms between the various indexes.  Table 4 shows 
the results of this exercise for regressions including each interactive term separately.   
 The results show few systematic interactive effects.  The interaction between the coverage 
and restrictions index yields few significant coefficients, and in the cases where significant 
coefficients are observed there are reasons to have robustness concerns.  For example, signs differ 
between the significant and insignificant coefficients for originations.  We observe similarly weak 
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results for the interaction of coverage with enforcement.  The originations results show nothing 
systematic, while the rejections and applications estimates reveal significant relationships for 2004 
but not 2005.   
 The lone exception to this is the restrictions-enforcement interaction, which shows 
significant positive coefficients for both applications and originations (except for one case).  In the 
applications case, the positive interaction suggests that enforcement mechanisms inhibit the 
likelihood of a subprime application less where restrictions are strong and vice versa.  This suggests 
that there might be a limit to the cumulative effects of these provisions, perhaps because there is a 
finite pool of applicants whose decisions might be affected by the nature of the legal framework. 
We observe a similar offset in terms of originations, though the individual enforcement effect here 
is much weaker.  
Putting it together: How legal framework provisions affect the market 
 Given the many moving parts in this framework, it is perhaps more straightforward to 
discern the relationships graphically based on a simulation using the coefficient estimates discussed 
above.29  Figures 1 through 3 show how our model using the 2005 combined index data predicts 
that applications, rejections, and originations would change as a state’s score changes along one 
dimension.  Because the results for originations are qualitatively similar when one uses the HUD 
list or HMDA price information to define a subprime loan, the two are discussed singly. 
 Figure 1 shows that the probability of a subprime origination increases significantly as a 
state law covers more loans.  By contrast, regulating more loans reduces the subprime application 
probability only slightly, even when one compares states at the extremes of the coverage index.  
Finally, increasing coverage reduces the probability that a subprime application will be denied.  
                                                 
29 Given the limited robustness of the interaction results, this discussion focuses on the coefficients obtained using 
specifications that omitted interactions. 
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Taken together, these suggest that the increased probability of origination as coverage increases is 
mainly due to a decline in the likelihood that a given application will be rejected.   
 For restrictions (figure 2), the outcomes relate to each other similarly, but produce the 
opposite outcome.  Here the probability of rejection rises considerably as a law becomes more 
restrictive, while applications again move only slightly, this time increasing as restrictions increase.  
Originations fall, though not nearly as much as rejections increase.  From this, it appears that 
originations decline because of an increased likelihood of denial, and the slight increase in 
applications that occurs as restrictions increase serves to offset the rejection effect and mute the 
overall decline in originations. 
 The graph for enforcement mechanisms (figure 3) shows somewhat smaller effects than 
those observed for the other two components.  The probability that a subprime loan is originated 
rises as one moves to states with broader enforcement measures.  This occurs despite the fact that 
subprime application probabilities fall as enforcement increases.30  Finally, rejection likelihoods 
decline as enforcement mechanisms increase.  In considering these three trends, it appears that the 
application and rejection trends offset each other, with the rejection trends prevailing such that 
subprime origination probabilities ultimately increase.   
Summary analysis 
 The results clearly indicate an important role for anti-predatory lending laws and highlight 
the importance of disaggregating the laws to focus on the effects of their different components.  We 
have shown that the extent of coverage, restrictions, and enforcement embodied in a state’s legal 
framework is associated with significant changes in the probability that a subprime application is 
rejected and a subprime loan is originated.  As the individual components of the newer laws become 
                                                 
30 While these probabilities are generally insignificant, their estimated magnitude is large. 
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stronger, they have different and often complimentary effects on applications, originations, and 
rejections.   
 These results can be used to paint different stories with different implications.  For example, 
better-quality applicants or greater efforts by lenders to discourage people with weak credit risks 
from applying could explain why increased coverage is associated with lower subprime rejection 
probabilities.  This would be a “modified lemons” story, whereby expanded coverage encourages 
people on the stronger end of the credit spectrum who previously avoided the subprime market to 
enter that market and obtain subprime loans. 
 Restrictions tend to increase the likelihood of rejection and hence retard originations in the 
subprime market.  Restrictions typically limit the menu of subprime products a lender can offer and 
reduce the lender’s ability to tailor products to the particular needs and profiles of borrowers.  
Borrowers who might have been served before may no longer find products for which they qualify.  
The higher rejection probabilities may also indicate that borrowers and lenders have not adjusted to 
the stricter lending standards through greater pre-screening of loan customers with weak credit 
profiles.  The increased likelihood of rejections from stronger restrictions could also be a sign, albeit 
an indirect one, that lenders are complying with the laws.31 
 Finally, the key result in the analysis of enforcement is that stronger enforcement 
mechanisms reduce subprime rejection probabilities.  The overall trend for enforcement is 
consistent with the view that the laws affect the market through changes in rejection probabilities.   
 In thinking about the results for enforcement mechanisms, one or more things could be 
going on.  On the lower end of the credit spectrum, fear of legal exposure may cause brokers and 
loan officers to discourage people with weaker credit from applying for subprime loans.   Removing 
these high risk applicants from the loan pool would reduce subprime rejection probabilities.  In 
                                                 
31 Cf. Li and Ernst (2006, pp. 11-13) (finding that loans in states with mini-HOEPA laws had fewer abusive terms). 
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addition, objective standards and quantifiable damages caps may give lenders greater certainty 
about their legal obligations and legal exposure, making them more comfortable with originating 
subprime loans. 
Ramifications of the Design of New Anti-Predatory Lending Laws 
 
“Slider Effects” 
 
 These results have important implications for the design of anti-predatory lending laws.  The 
three major components of anti-predatory lending laws – coverage, restrictions, and enforcement 
mechanisms – have “slider effects” in which the strength of one component offsets the negative 
effects of another.   
 To test and illustrate this, we selected seven states with newer laws featuring different 
combinations of weak and strong components and compared the outcomes in those states with those 
in Montana, which had (and still has) no anti-predatory lending law.  Using the 2005 data for the 
newer laws, we simulated how each particular state’s law would affect the likelihood of 
originations, applications, and rejections relative to Montana.  
As seen in Table 5, for four model laws — Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and 
Minnesota – both the probability of a subprime application and that of a subprime rejection went 
down compared to Montana.  In each case, moreover, the likelihood of rejection dropped more than 
the likelihood of a subprime application.  As a result, in these four states, the probability of a 
subprime origination rose.  For the other three model states, rejection probabilities rose relative to 
Montana’s, but application rates either increased or fell relative to Montana only slightly.  For these 
three states, we do not see a consistent signal regarding subprime origination probabilities.  One 
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could infer an increased origination likelihood (Massachusetts), no change (North Carolina),32 and a 
reduced origination likelihood (Oklahoma). 
What distinguishes the second group of three model laws from the four model laws that 
show a consistent increase in origination probability?  Essentially, the second group of model laws 
(based on laws in Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Oklahoma) has narrower coverage than 
restrictions.  For instance, the Oklahoma-type law has the lowest score for coverage but a medium 
score for restrictions, while the North Carolina-type law features low-to-medium coverage with 
high restrictions.  The Massachusetts-type law follows a similar pattern, combining medium 
coverage with the highest score for restrictions.  In Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and 
Minnesota, in comparison, the relative coverage is as strong or stronger than the restrictions.  
The Effects of Strict Assignee Liability Laws 
 Our simulation also sheds light on the effect of assignee liability laws on flows of subprime 
credit, which is currently a topic of hot debate.  In Table 6, we simulate the effect of adopting either 
of the two strictest types of assignee liability laws and compare those effects to outcomes in 
Montana, which has no law.    Two of our model laws – patterned on laws in Nevada and 
Pennsylvania – impose full assignee liability with no safe harbors.  The other seven model laws – 
patterned on the laws in New Mexico, Massachusetts, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, New Jersey, and 
West Virginia – create a limited safe harbor for assignees who perform due diligence and do not 
engage in willful violations of the law.  Under those seven model laws, assignees who qualify for 
the safe harbor are only subject to limited claims and defenses that the borrower could raise against 
the lender.  All other assignees are subject to full liability for all claims and defenses available 
against the lender. 
                                                 
32 Here and throughout this chapter, we evaluate North Carolina law only as of 2004 and 2005, not as of 2007, when 
North Carolina amended its mini-HOEPA law in order to strengthen it. 
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 Our simulation results show no definitive effect of assignee liability on the likelihood of 
subprime originations, even when the liability provisions are in their strongest form.  In many 
instances, we observe higher probabilities of origination, relative to Montana, across the two 
definitions of subprime lending (HUD list and HMDA price); in a smaller number of cases, 
origination probabilities are lower than those in Montana.   
 Our simulation results are based on credit flows for calendar year 2005.  Given the events of 
2007, when delinquencies of subprime mortgages skyrocketed and investors fled the market for 
subprime mortgage-backed securities, it is necessary to ask whether our results still hold or whether 
assignee liability laws played a role in investor flight.    
 While it is too early to arrive at a definitive answer to this question, several factors suggest 
that the dismal performance of subprime loans in late 2006 and in 2007 and the resulting inability to 
value subprime mortgage-backed securities, not assignee liability provisions, were what prompted 
the exit.  First, in the summer of 2007, investors fled the entire subprime market (and even 
instruments remotely tied to that market), not just in states with assignee liability laws.33  Second, as 
our origination results suggest, investors invested heavily in loans from states with assignee liability 
laws of various strengths for several years before the subprime market collapsed.  This suggests that 
the poor performance of subprime loans, which experienced a sharp downturn in the months 
preceding the market’s collapse, was the precipitating factor for the implosion, not assignee liability 
laws.  Finally, most states with assignee liability laws, such as New Mexico and West Virginia, also 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Standard & Poor’s (2007) (noting that by September 12, 2007, “Wall Street firms, banks and investors ha[d] 
almost completely lost their appetite for nonagency mortgage-backed assets,” including subprime MBS); cf. Federal 
Reserve (2007) (cutting the federal funds and discount rates by 50 basis points on September 18, 2007 because “the 
tightening of credit conditions ha[d] the potential to intensify the housing correction and to restrain economic growth 
more generally”). 
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regulated loan terms such as prepayment penalties and balloon clauses to curtail the higher risk of 
default and foreclosure associated with those terms.34   
Unanswered Questions 
 
 Our results raise as many questions as they answer.  In this section, we discuss future 
research avenues suggested by our findings.35 
The Implications of Referring Loan Applicants to Loans Priced Below the Triggers 
 Future research is needed to clarify the meaning of our findings on the effects of restrictions 
in the newer laws.  We find that stronger restrictions make a prime origination more likely relative 
to a subprime origination.  This indicates that lenders and brokers may be doing a better job of 
screening stronger loan candidates and referring them to loans that are not subject to the laws.  
What this means is not entirely clear.  Our results could mean that lenders and brokers referred 
these applicants to less expensive36 and safer loans.  Alternatively, originators may have referred 
applicants to risky loan products that are consciously written to evade the triggers of a particular 
state law.  In a third scenario, irrespective of state laws, originators may have referred applicants to 
loan products featuring low initial interest rates with low monthly payments, but with high rate 
resets.  This practice would have enabled lenders to underwrite loans based on lower, initial interest 
rates and thus increase the likelihood that applicants would qualify for loans. 
  Concerns about evasion arise from the fact that most of the newer anti-predatory lending 
laws have triggers that hinge on a loan’s APR or total points and fees.  Any loans that fall below 
both triggers will escape regulation under these statutes.  Most of these triggers can be gamed by 
                                                 
34 Quercia et al. (2005, p. 25).   
35 In addition to the discussion that follows, future extensions will likely include consideration of differences in state 
foreclosure laws, exploration of the geographical distribution of legal frameworks, and estimation of the effects of laws 
according to lien status, owner-occupancy status, and refinance versus purchase loans. 
36 We cannot measure the extent of migration to cheaper loans because both of the definitions of subprime loans used in 
this chapter are subject to limitations.  The HUD list does not identify subprime loans at the loan level and the HMDA 
price test categorizes first-lien loans below the 300 bps spread – which is a relatively large spread -- as prime.   
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writing an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) with a low introductory teaser rate that later adjusts to a 
fully indexed rate above the trigger.  Currently, under the Truth in Lending Act, the APR formula 
for teaser-rate ARMs is a composite of the teaser rate for the introductory period and the fully-
indexed rate at closing for the remaining term of the loan.37  By lengthening the introductory period 
and offering a low teaser rate, it is possible to produce an APR for an ultimately expensive loan that 
nevertheless falls below the APR trigger.   
 During 2004 and 2005, there was a shift in the product mix of subprime loans, raising 
questions about the reason for that shift.  Over that period, hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARMs) and interest-only ARMs became much more prevalent, relative to fixed-rate loans, in the 
subprime market.38  ARMs made up 74 percent of non-prime loans in 2004 and 79 percent in 
2005.39  A disproportionate number of the subprime ARMs for those years had low annual teaser 
rates of four percent or less for two years, three years or five years.40  Similarly, interest-only loans 
(many of which were subprime loans) mushroomed in 2004 and 2005.41   
 Evasion is not the only possible explanation for this shift in product mix.  In 2004 and 2005, 
interest rates were rising and so were home prices.  Lenders, believing that they could take on more 
risk because of home appreciation, may have marketed hybrid ARMs and interest-only ARMs 
products more vigorously to applicants who did not qualify for other loans.42  The fact that hybrid 
ARMs and interest-only ARMs were offered across the country, both in heavily regulated and 
lightly regulated states, gives this explanation currency.   
                                                 
37 12 C.F.R. § 226.22 & app. J to 12 C.F.R. pt. 226. 
38 Duncan (2006, p. 18); see also Avery et al. (2007, pp. 8-9); Cutts (2007, p. 13). 
39 Walsh (2006, p. 5). 
40 Cagan (2006, pp. 24-27); see also Cagan (2007); FitchRatings (2006a, pp. 2-3).   
41 FitchRatings (2006a); FitchRatings (2006b); FitchRatings (2006c). 
42 See, e.g., Pavlov & Wachter (2007, pp. 23, 27-30) (areas with higher concentrations of nontraditional ARMs have 
affordability constraints and experience faster home price appreciation during up markets). 
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 Without more detailed information on loans, we cannot tell whether the product shift toward 
ARMs was motivated by rising home prices or evasion.  Future research using loan-level data on 
loan type and the presence of teaser rates on loans would shed light on this issue.  Research would 
also be helpful on the effects, both good and bad, of including more fees (such as prepayment 
penalties and yield spread premiums) in triggers for points and fees and of redefining the APR 
trigger at the fully indexed rate. 
The Implications of Increased Subprime Originations  
 Our findings also raise questions for the policy implications of the higher probability of 
subprime originations that result from broader coverage.  On the one hand, broader coverage 
expands access to credit, which is generally seen as desirable.  On the other hand, from a policy 
perspective, lawmakers should be wary of writing laws that encourage consumers to enter markets 
rife with lax underwriting or abusive practices, as the recent subprime experience shows.  If a law 
has broad coverage but restrictions or enforcement that are overly weak, the law may give 
consumers false confidence that they will be shielded from abuses when they apply for subprime 
loans.   
How Well Did Loans Perform In States Governed by the Newer Laws? 
  
 The subprime crisis raises the related question, i.e., how well did loans perform in states 
with anti-predatory lending laws relative to loans in other states?  It is well known by now that the 
2005, 2006, and 2007 books of subprime loans had significantly elevated rates of delinquency and 
default.43  Future research is needed on the effects of state anti-predatory laws on the performance 
of subprime loans and the associated welfare effects.  Questions of interest include:   How well did 
loans covered by state anti-predatory lending laws perform?  How well did non-covered loans in 
those states perform?  Non-covered loans include loans originated in states with newer laws that fell 
                                                 
43 Sabry & Schopflocher (2007, pp. 8-10); Standard & Poor’s (2007); Youngblood (2006). 
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below a law’s triggers and loans originated in the same states that were exempt from coverage due 
to federal preemption.  In comparison, what was the default experience of loans in states without 
anti-predatory lending laws?  Finally, in assessing performance, did it matter whether a state’s mini-
HOEPA law imposed underwriting standards on borrowers’ ability to pay?  In our canvass of state 
laws, some mini-HOEPA laws adopted such standards and others did not.   
What Was the Effect of Federal Preemption? 
 
 National banks, federal savings associations, and their mortgage lending subsidiaries are 
exempt from state anti-predatory lending laws and state enforcement under federal preemption 
orders issued by federal banking regulators under the Home Owners’ Loan Act44 and the National 
Bank Act.45  In contrast, mortgage brokers and independent non-depository lenders, along with 
many state-chartered depository institutions and their subsidiaries,46 must comply with most 
provisions in state anti-predatory lending laws.47  While estimates vary, in 2004 and 2005, possibly 
thirty to fifty percent of subprime mortgage loans originated in states with mini-HOEPA laws were 
exempt from compliance with those laws due to federal preemption.48   
 Dual regulation creates a natural experiment for exploring the effects of different modes of 
regulation and their strength.  During 2004 and 2005, national banks, federal savings associations, 
                                                 
44 12 C.F.R. § 560.2. 
45 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.3, 34.4).  Federal preemption for national banks and 
their operating subsidiaries did not take effect until Feb. 12, 2004.  See id.  
46 In isolated cases, state “wild card” laws may excuse state-chartered banks and thrifts from having to observe state 
mini-HOEPA laws.  For instance, Georgia has a wild card law that exempts state-chartered banks and thrifts and their 
subsidiaries from state anti-predatory lending laws to the same extent as national banks and federal thrifts.  See, e.g., 
Official Code of Georgia Ann. §7-6A-12. 
47 We say “most provisions” because the federal Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA) exempts most 
lenders, including independent non-depository lenders, from having to comply with state limitations on balloon clauses 
except for traditional fixed-rate, fully amortizing mortgages.  A few states exercised their right to timely opt out of 
federal preemption under AMTPA.  Renuart & Keest (2005, §§ 3.10.1, 3.10.2 at n. 679). 
48 Robert Avery, Kenneth Brevoort and Glenn Canner report that depository institutions and their subsidiaries together 
made 37.4% of all higher-priced loans reported under HMDA in 2004 and 35.8% in 2005.  That sum rose to 40.9% in 
2006.  Avery et al. (2007, p. 25 and tbl. 9).   For purposes of determining the number of loans shielded by federal 
preemption, these sums are overinclusive because they include state depository institutions and subsidiaries that had to 
comply with state laws.  At the same time, the sums are underinclusive because they omit loans by other non-depository 
lenders that were preempted from some state restrictions under AMTPA. 
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and their mortgage lending subsidiaries were subject to very few restrictions on the terms in their 
mortgage loans.  Both types of federal depository institutions, however, did face capital regulation 
and periodic examinations for safety and soundness, community reinvestment, and lending 
discrimination.  Independent non-depository lenders were exempt from those examinations, but had 
to comply with the state laws.  State banks and thrifts were often subject to both. 
 This scheme presents several interesting questions for exploration.  What effect did federal 
preemption have on subprime flows of credit and why?  Did the relative lack of legal restrictions on 
federally preempted loans affect the default risk of those loans?  Could consumers discern which 
loans were covered by state anti-predatory lending laws or did federally preempted loans receive a 
spillover effect from increased consumer confidence in regulated states?  Is there a difference in 
origination rates and quality of loan performance between loans originated by national banks and 
federal savings associations (which have heavy federal banking regulation) and their mortgage 
lending subsidiaries (which were lightly regulated)?  Do federally preempted loans display a higher 
incidence of injurious loan practices and terms, such as long prepayment clauses or yield spread 
premiums?   Finally, did federally chartered depository institutions and their subsidiaries gain 
relative market share in regulated states? 
Conclusion 
 In this study, we measure the effect of state anti-predatory lending laws on the flow of 
subprime credit. Our findings are robust and sometimes counterintuitive.  For example, it has long 
been assumed that broadening the market coverage of an anti-predatory lending law would impede 
access to credit.  We find, however, that broader coverage is associated with much lower 
probabilities of subprime loans being rejected.  As a result, expanded coverage tends to increase 
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access to subprime credit, as do increased enforcement mechanisms.  Stronger restrictions have the 
opposite effect, likely by limiting the types of subprime loan products that a lender can offer.   
 The 2007 crisis in subprime is evidence that the subprime mortgage market is immature and 
in a state of flux.  Already, the subprime market of 2007 is quite different from the market of 2004 
and 2005.  We do not know what direction the subprime market ultimately will take, but we expect 
that the market that emerges out of the current situation will be subject to greater controls.  Some 
may be in the form of federal and state legislation.  Others may be through new, more stringent, 
underwriting standards adopted by regulators, lenders, or securitizers.  Whatever forms these 
controls take, our findings shed some light on the efficacy of different approaches. 
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Table 1. Regression Results for Originations 
Dep. Var. Origination Probability 
Year 2005 2004 
Subprime def. HUD List HMDA Price HUD List 
Specification 
 Variable 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Specification 1       
 Old IndexA 0.009* (0.005) 
1.02 0.032*** 
(0.004) 
1.09 0.014** 
(0.005) 
1.04 
 New IndexA -0.002 (0.004) 
0.99 0.004 
(0.004) 
1.01 -0.001 
(0.004) 
1.00 
Specification 2       
 Old IndexM 0.002* (0.001) 
1.03 0.006 
(0.001) 
1.07 0.003* 
(0.001) 
1.03 
 New IndexM -0.001 (0.001) 
0.98 0.000 
(0.001) 
1.00 -0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.97 
Specification 3       
 Combined 
 Restrictions 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
0.92 -0.025* 
(0.010) 
0.96 -0.031* 
(0.015) 
0.95 
 Combined 
 Coverage 
0.047 
(0.010) 
1.09 0.045*** 
(0.008) 
1.08 0.036*** 
(0.010) 
1.07 
 Combined 
 Enforcement 
0.029 
(0.014) 
1.05 0.042*** 
(0.011) 
1.07 0.015 
(0.016) 
1.02 
Specification 4       
 Old restrictions -0.005 (0.016) 
0.99 0.000 
(0.013) 
1.00 -0.004 
(0.017) 
1.00 
 Old coverage -0.035 (0.027) 
0.97 0.054* 
(0.022) 
1.05 -0.003 
(0.033) 
1.00 
 Old enforcement 0.064*** (0.020) 
1.07 0.049** 
(0.017) 
1.05 0.052* 
(0.025) 
1.06 
 New restrictions -0.097*** (0.019) 
0.89 -0.038* 
(0.016) 
0.96 -0.048* 
(0.024) 
0.95 
 New coverage 0.054*** (0.011) 
1.09 0.037*** 
(0.009) 
1.06 0.037*** 
(0.010) 
1.06 
 New enforcement 0.041 (0.021) 
1.05 0.020 
(0.018) 
1.02 -0.006 
(0.024) 
.099 
*-significant at p<.05, ** - significant at p < .01, *** - significant at p < .001.  
Odds ratios reflect a one standard deviation increase in the variable. List refers to samples in which 
subprime loans were identified using the HUD-generated subprime lender list.  Price refers to 
samples in which subprime loans were identified using the high cost loan indicator in the HMDA 
data. 
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Table 2. Regression Results for Rejection Probability 
 
Year 2004 2005 
Specification 
 Variable 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Specification 1     
 Old IndexA -0.013*** (0.004) 
0.97 -0.004 
(0.003) 
0.99 
 New IndexA -0.002 (0.003) 
0.99 0.003 
(0.003) 
1.01 
Specification 2     
 Old IndexM -0.002*** (0.001) 
0.97 -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.99 
 New IndexM -0.001* (0.001) 
0.98 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.99 
Specification 3     
 Combined 
 restrictions 
0.074*** 
(0.011) 
1.13 0.098*** 
(0.009) 
1.18 
 Combined 
 coverage 
-0.078*** 
(0.007) 
0.87 -0.091*** 
(0.007) 
0.85 
 Combined 
 enforcement 
-0.028* 
(0.011) 
0.96 -0.030* 
(0.010) 
0.95 
Specification 4     
 Old restrictions 0.041*** (0.013) 
1.05 0.051*** 
(0.012) 
1.06 
 Old coverage -0.085*** (0.024) 
0.93 -0.055** 
(0.019) 
0.95 
 Old enforcement -0.023 (0.018) 
0.98 -0.033* 
(0.014) 
0.96 
 New restrictions 0.132*** (0.017) 
1.17 0.155*** 
(0.013) 
1.20 
 New coverage -0.081*** (0.007) 
0.88 -0.098*** 
(0.008) 
0.85 
 New enforcement -0.048** (0.018) 
0.95 -0.069*** 
(0.015) 
0.93 
*-significant at p<.05, ** - significant at p < .01, *** - significant at p < .001. 
Odds ratios reflect a one standard deviation increase in the variable. Subprime loans were identified 
using the HUD-generated list of subprime lenders in both years. 
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Table 3. Regression Results for Application Probability 
 
Year 2004 2005 
Specification 
 Variable 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Specification 1     
 Old IndexA -0.001 (0.004) 
1.00 0.004 
(0.004) 
1.01 
 New IndexA -0.015*** (0.004) 
0.95 -0.006 
(0.003) 
0.98 
Specification 2     
 Old IndexM 0.000 (0.001) 
1.00 0.002* 
(0.001) 
1.02 
 New IndexM -0.004*** (0.001) 
0.93 -0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.97 
Specification 3     
 Combined 
 restrictions 
0.002 
(0.012) 
1.00 0.018 
(0.010) 
1.03 
 Combined 
 coverage 
-0.025** 
(0.008) 
0.96 -0.005 
(0.008) 
0.99 
 Combined 
 enforcement 
-0.004 
(0.013 
0.99 -0.024* 
(0.011) 
0.96 
Specification 4     
 Old restrictions 0.032* (0.014) 
1.04 0.057*** 
(0.013) 
1.07 
 Old coverage -0.126*** (0.026) 
0.90 -0.064** 
(0.021) 
0.95 
 Old enforcement 0.065** (0.020) 
1.07 0.003 
(0.016) 
1.00 
 New restrictions 0.015 (0.019) 
1.02 -0.014 
(0.015) 
0.98 
 New coverage -0.026** (0.008) 
0.96 -0.002 
(0.008) 
1.00 
 New enforcement -0.050* (0.020) 
0.95 -0.020 
(0.017) 
0.98 
*-significant at p<.05, ** - significant at p < .01, *** - significant at p < .001. 
Odds ratios reflect a one standard deviation increase in the variable. Subprime loans were identified 
using the HUD-generated list of subprime lenders in both years. 
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Table 4.  The Coefficients on the Interactive Terms 
 
 Coverage*Restrictions Coverage*Enforcement Restrictions*Enforcement
Originations    
 2004 – List 0.006 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.006) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
 2005 – List -0.018** 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
 2005 – Price 0.002 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
Rejections (List)    
 2004 0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
 2005 0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.014** 
(0.004) 
Applications 
(List) 
   
 2004 -0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.005) 
 2005 -0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
*-significant at p<.05, ** - significant at p < .01, *** - significant at p < .001. 
Odds ratios reflect a one standard deviation increase in the variable. Each coefficient in the table 
was obtained by running a separate regression.  Specifications in which all coefficients are included 
together are not shown.  List refers to samples in which subprime loans were identified using the 
HUD-generated subprime lender list.  Price refers to samples in which subprime loans were 
identified using the high cost loan indicator in the HMDA data. 
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Table 5.  Simulation of Model Laws:  Percent Change Relative to Montana (With No Law) 
 
  Nevada 
Model 
Oklahoma 
Model 
North 
Carolina 
Model 
New 
York 
Model 
Massa- 
chusetts 
Model 
New 
Mexico 
Model 
Minnesota 
Model 
 Component        
 Coverage Least 
(1.00) 
Least 
(1.00) 
Low-
Medium 
(2.72) 
Medium 
(3.15) 
Medium 
(3.15) 
Broad 
(5.17) 
Broadest 
(7.46) 
 Restrictions Least 
(1.00) 
Medium 
(3.18) 
High 
(4.27) 
Medium 
(2.91) 
Highest 
(4.82) 
High 
(4.27) 
Low  
(1.55) 
 Enforcement 
Mechanisms 
Highest 
(3.81) 
Medium 
(3.11) 
Low 
(2.41) 
Medium 
(2.76) 
High 
(3.46) 
High 
(3.46) 
Lowest 
(1.00) 
Outcome         
Origination         
   List  7.6% -4.8% -4.5% 4.7% -2.6% 8.8% 27.8% 
   Price  9.2% 2.6% 4.3% 9.6% 8.2% 16.7% 22.4% 
Application  -5.3% -0.9% 1.3% -1.5% -0.1% -1.8% -2.00% 
Rejection  -5.7% 10.4% 8.4% -4.2% 7.1% -8.8% -32.4% 
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Table 6.  Simulation of Assignee Liability Laws:  Percent Change Relative to Montana (With No Law) 
 
 
*   This row reports the raw score for assignee liability before being scaled down for the overall enforcement mechanism index.  A raw 
assignee liability score of 3.00 means that assignees who exercise due diligence are subject to limited claims and defenses, while other 
assignees (plus any assignees guilty of willful violations) are subject to full liability for claims and defenses.  A raw assignee liability 
score of 4.00 means assignees have full liability for claims and defenses, regardless of due diligence.  Model laws based on states with 
the strongest assignee liability laws – i.e., with raw scores of 4.00 -- are shaded in gray.
  New 
Mexico 
Model 
Massa-
chusetts 
Model 
Illinois 
Model 
Indiana 
Model 
Maine 
Model 
New 
Jersey 
Model 
West 
Virginia 
Model 
Nevada 
Model 
Pennsyl- 
vania 
Model 
 Component          
 Coverage Broad 
(5.17) 
Medium 
(3.15) 
Medium
-Broad 
(4.74) 
Low  
(2.29) 
Least 
(1.00) 
Med-
ium 
(3.15) 
Broad 
(6.6) 
Least 
(1.00) 
Least 
(1.00) 
 Restrictions High 
(4.27) 
Highest 
(4.82) 
Medium
(2.91) 
High 
(4.00) 
Low 
(1.55) 
Med-
High 
(3.73) 
Medium
(2.64) 
Least 
(1.00) 
Medium 
(2.36) 
 Enforcement 
Mechanisms 
High 
(3.46) 
High 
(3.46) 
High 
(3.46) 
High 
(3.46) 
High 
(3.46) 
High 
(3.46) 
Medium
(2.76) 
Highest 
(3.81) 
High 
(3.11) 
 Raw 
Assignee     
Liability   
Score* 
3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 
Outcome           
Origination           
  List  8.8% -2.6% 14.0% -2.4% 3.9% 2.6% 22.6% 7.6% -1.0% 
  Price  16.7% 8.2% 17.9% 6.7% 7.0% 10.4% 23.1% 9.2% 4.2% 
Application  -1.8% -0.1% -3.5% -0.9% -3.9% -1.7% -3.4% -5.3% -2.0% 
Rejection  -8.8% 7.1% -14.7% 7.0% -1.4% -0.2% -25.1% -5.7% 4.8% 
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Figure 1. The Impact of Law Coverage on the Mortgage Outcome 
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Figure 2. The Impact of Law Restrictions on the Mortgage Outcome 
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Figure 3: The Impact of Law Enforcement Mechanisms on the Mortgage Outcome 
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APPENDIX   --  A1. Scoring Scheme – Index Creation 
Each component is made up of various dimensions.  We convert subcomponent scores to a 0-1 scale and then 
roll them up into a consolidated dimension score. This score is then rescaled by dividing by the component 
average score to insure that the indexes are not overly representative in terms of absolute value or variance of 
any single subcomponent.  Consider the creation of the old law coverage index for Alaska.  Because Alaska’s 
score for loan purpose was a 2 and the maximum loan purpose score is 4, Alaska’s converted loan purpose 
value is 0.5. The same procedure yields scores of 1 for the APR trigger 1st lien, the APR trigger higher liens, 
and the points and fees trigger subcomponents.  These values sum up to 3.5 for Alaska.  This sum is then 
divided by the average coverage value for all states (2.068627), then added to one, resulting in Alaska’s 
coverage index value being 2.69 (1 + 3.5/ 2.068627).   The additive version takes the value of each 
component and adds them together (indexA).  We also create a multiplicative index (indexM).     
Coverage dimensions  
Loan type 0 = HOEPA equivalent  
1 = law does not cover government loans 
2 = law does not cover reverse and/or open-ended loans  
3 = law does not cover business and/or construction loans  
4 = law covers all loans 
APR trigger for first lien mortgages 0 = HOEPA equivalent 
1 = 7-8 % plus the comparable Treasury security yield  
2 = 6-7 % plus the comparable Treasury security yield  
3 = no APR trigger 
APR trigger for subordinate mortgages 0 = HOEPA equivalent 
1 = 9-10% plus comparable Treasury security yield  
2 = 8-9% plus comparable Treasury security yield  
3 = 6-8% plus comparable Treasury security yield  
4 = no APR trigger 
Points and fees trigger 0 = HOEPA equivalent (8% of loan amount or $400) 
1 = 6-8 % of the total loan amount  
2 = 5-6 % of the total loan amount 
3 = less than 5 % of the total loan amount 
4 = no points and fees trigger 
Restrictions dimensions  
Prepayment penalties 0 = no prepayment penalty restrictions 
1 = bans all penalties 60-84 months after origination 
2 = bans all penalties 36-42 months after origination 
3 = bans all penalties 24 months after origination 
4 = bans all prepayment penalties 
Balloon payments 0 = no restriction 
1 = no balloons allowed in first 7 years of loan 
2 = no balloons allowed in first 10 years of loan 
3 = no balloons allowed after 10 or more years of loan 
4 = no balloons allowed 
Credit counseling requirements 0 = credit counseling not required  
1 = credit counseling recommended  
2 = credit counseling is required 
Limits on judicial relief/ mandatory 
arbitration 
0 =  does not prohibit restrictions on judicial relief 
1 =  limits restrictions on judicial relief  
2 =  prohibits restrictions on judicial relief 
Enforcement dimensions  
Assignee liability 0 = no assignee liability for holders in due course 
1 = only relief against assignees is defensive 
2 = assignee liability only if no due diligence 
3 = assignees subject to limited claims and defenses  
4 = assignees are liable even if they exercise due diligence 
Enforcement against originators 0 = state government enforcement only 
1 = borrower recovery limited to compensatory relief  
2 = borrower relief compensatory and punitive  
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A2. Mini-HOEPA Index 
State Coverage Restrictions Enforcement Index -- Additive Index -- Multiplicative
Alaska 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Alabama 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Arizona 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Arkansas 2.72 3.73 3.11 9.56 31.58
California 3.15 2.36 2.41 7.93 17.95
Colorado 1.43 2.64 3.11 7.18 11.73
Connecticut 1.86 2.91 3.11 7.88 16.85
Delaware 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
District of Columbia 4.74 2.91 3.11 10.75 42.85
Florida 1.00 2.64 3.11 6.75 8.20
Georgia 2.72 4.00 3.11 9.83 33.89
Hawaii 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Idaho 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Illinois 4.74 2.91 3.46 11.11 47.69
Indiana 2.29 4.00 3.46 9.76 31.75
Iowa 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Kansas 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Kentucky 1.86 3.18 3.81 8.86 22.59
Louisiana 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Maine 1.00 1.55 3.46 6.01 5.35
Maryland 2.44 1.55 2.41 6.39 9.06
Massachusetts 3.15 4.82 3.46 11.44 52.63
Michigan 6.17 1.82 1.00 8.99 11.22
Minnesota 7.46 1.55 1.00 10.01 11.54
Mississippi 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Missouri 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Montana 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Nebraska 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Nevada 1.00 1.00 3.81 5.81 3.81
New Hampshire 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
New Jersey 3.15 3.73 3.46 10.34 40.71
New Mexico 5.17 4.27 3.46 12.90 76.42
New York 3.15 2.91 2.76 8.82 25.32
North Carolina 2.72 4.27 2.41 9.40 28.01
North Dakota 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Ohio 1.00 2.36 3.11 6.47 7.35
Oklahoma 1.00 3.18 3.11 7.29 9.90
Oregon 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Pennsylvania 1.00 2.36 3.11 6.47 7.35
Rhode Island 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
South Carolina 1.86 3.18 2.76 7.80 16.34
South Dakota 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Tennessee 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Texas 1.86 2.36 3.11 7.34 13.69
Utah 2.72 3.18 1.00 6.91 8.67
Vermont 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Virginia 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Washington 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
West Virginia 6.60 2.64 2.76 12.00 48.02
Wisconsin 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Wyoming 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Average 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 13.03
Min 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
Max 7.46 4.82 3.81 12.90 76.42
Standard Deviation 1.62 1.17 1.10 3.19 17.36
New Laws (Mini-Hoepa)
 
1 indicates that there is no law or that one of the parts of the law has little or no practical impact. 
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A3. Older Law Index 
  Older laws (Before Mini-Hoepa) 
State Coverage Restrictions Enforcement Index -- Additive Index -- Multiplicative 
Alabama 2.69 3.68 1.64 8.02 16.28 
Alaska 2.57 3.68 3.57 9.82 33.78 
Arizona 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Arkansas 2.93 2.34 1.00 6.28 6.87 
California 2.93 1.67 2.92 7.53 14.34 
Colorado 2.45 3.68 2.92 9.06 26.40 
Connecticut 2.81 2.34 1.00 6.15 6.59 
Delaware 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Dist of Columbia 2.93 2.34 2.28 7.56 15.69 
Florida 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Georgia 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Hawaii 1.85 1.67 2.92 6.44 9.02 
Idaho 2.81 2.34 3.57 8.72 23.49 
Illinois 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Indiana 2.93 2.34 2.92 8.20 20.09 
Iowa 2.93 3.68 1.64 8.26 17.74 
Kansas 2.93 3.68 3.57 10.18 38.54 
Kentucky 2.57 1.67 2.92 7.17 12.57 
Louisiana 2.81 1.67 1.00 5.48 4.70 
Maine 2.57 3.68 2.92 9.18 27.70 
Maryland 2.57 3.68 3.57 9.82 33.78 
Massachusetts  1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Michigan 2.57 2.34 1.96 6.88 11.82 
Minnesota 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Mississippi 2.93 1.67 2.92 7.53 14.34 
Missouri 2.81 1.67 2.92 7.41 13.75 
Montana 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Nebraska 2.93 1.00 1.64 5.58 4.82 
Nevada 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
New Hampshire 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
New Jersey 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
New Mexico 2.93 3.68 3.57 10.18 38.54 
New York 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
North Carolina 2.69 2.34 2.92 7.96 18.44 
North Dakota 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Ohio 2.93 1.67 2.92 7.53 14.34 
Oklahoma 1.97 3.68 3.57 9.22 25.84 
Oregon 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Pennsylvania 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Rhode Island 2.93 3.01 1.00 6.95 8.84 
South Carolina 2.93 3.68 3.57 10.18 38.54 
South Dakota 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Tennessee 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Texas 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Utah 2.81 3.68 3.57 10.06 36.95 
Vermont 2.57 3.68 2.92 9.18 27.70 
Virginia 2.81 1.00 3.57 7.38 10.03 
Washington 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
West Virginia 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Wisconsin 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Wyoming 1.85 3.68 3.57 9.10 24.25 
Average 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 12.09 
Min 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Max 2.93 3.68 3.57 10.18 38.54 
Standard Deviation 0.88 1.12 1.09 2.75 12.47 
1 indicates that there is no law or that one of the parts of the law has little or no practical impact. 
